美国联邦存款保险公司 发表评论(0) 编辑词条

美国联邦存款保险公司网站网址：http://www.fdic.gov

美国联邦存款保险公司

　　　美国联邦存款保险公司(FDIC)当地时间二十五日晚宣布了美国历史上最大的银行倒闭案，总部位于华盛顿州的华盛顿互惠银行资不抵债立即停业，由摩根大通以十九亿美元的超低价收购这家有一百一十九年历史、曾经拥有三千亿美元资产和一千八百八十亿美元存款的银行的部分业务和分支机构。鉴于华盛顿互惠银行(Washington Mutual)“流动性不足,无法满足公司债务的支付要求,因而该行不能安全、稳定地进行业务”，美国储蓄机构监理局(OTS)当地时间二十五日晚勒令华盛顿互惠银行停业。这是自一九八四年伊利诺伊州大陆国民银行倒闭以来，美国历史上最大的银行倒闭案。据美国联邦存款保险公司(FDIC)二十五日晚间发表的一份声明称，由摩根大通以十九亿美元的成本收购华盛顿互助银行的存款业务、分支机构以及其他业务。尽管华盛顿互惠银行旗下的数千亿资产瞬间蒸发，但这笔收购对华盛顿互助银行现有的储蓄客户以及其他客户都不会造成任何影响，华盛顿互惠银行周五将照常营业。

　　联邦存款保险公司（Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation,FDIC)是由美国国会在1930年大萧条时期大量银行被挤兑后创立的。截至2007年底，它已拥有524亿美元的国家储蓄保险基金。

　　为恢复存款人对银行系统的信任，美国在大危机后的1934年，根据《1933年银行法》建立了联邦存款保险公司。联邦存款保险公司由理事会负责管理，理事会成员内5人组成，其成员包括货币监理署总监、储蓄管理办公室主任以及总统任命的其他3名理事(含理事会主席)。

　　美国法律要求国民银行、联邦储备体系会员银行必须参加存款保险，不是联邦储备体系成员的州立银行和其他金融机构可自愿参加保险。目前，新成立的银行都必须投保。实际上，美国几乎所有的银行都参加了保险。联邦存款保险公司对每个账户的保险金额最高为10万美元。

　　联邦存款保险公司的资本来源于向投保银行收取的保险费。1999年以前保费按固定比例收取，现改按差别比例收取。收取比例确定的依据是，先按资本充足情况将投保银行分为上、中、下三组，再按监管情况分为A、B、C三组，然后分别确定不同档次的保费收取比例。保费收取比例最高为27／10000；最低为 0。同时法律授权联邦存款保险公司在紧急情况下，有权向美国财政部借款300亿美元。

The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) is a United States government corporation created by the Glass-Steagall Act of 1933. It provides deposit insurance which guarantees the safety of checking and savings deposits in member banks, currently up to $100,000 per depositor per bank. The vast number of bank failures in the Great Depression spurred the United States Congress to create an institution to guarantee deposits held by commercial banks, inspired by the Commonwealth of Massachusetts and its Depositors Insurance Fund (DIF).

The FDIC insures accounts at different banks separately. For example, a person with accounts at two separate banks (not merely branches of the same bank) can keep $100,000 in each account and be insured for the total of $200,000. Also, accounts in different ownerships (such as beneficial ownership, trusts, and joint accounts) are considered separately for the $100,000 insurance limit. The Federal Deposit Insurance Reform Act of 2005 raised the amount of insurance for an Individual Retirement Account to $250,000.

Inception

The 19th century economy of the United States was characterized by occasional bank panics, with corresponding economic downturns and unemployment. After the particularly severe Panic of 1893, legislators sought to arrange better security for bank deposits. William Jennings Bryan, for example, proposed a national bank guarantee fund for use during bank runs. Although deposit security measures were adopted at the state level, the federal government chose a "lender of last resort" approach in the form of the Federal Reserve System.

This system failed to prevent an early bank panic in 1933, at the end of Herbert Hoover's term as president. The panic saw 4,004 banks closed, with an average of $900,000 in deposits. Under the federal government's supervision, these banks were merged into stronger banks. Many months later, depositors received compensation for roughly 85% of their former deposits.[citation needed] Incoming President Franklin D. Roosevelt, a former banker himself, did not like the insurance approach, but he agreed to it to restore confidence in the banking system.[citation needed]

In May 1933, the U.S. House Banking and Currency Committee submitted a bill that would insure deposits 100 percent to $10,000, and after that on a sliding scale; it would be financed by a small assessment on the banks. However the U.S. Senate Banking Committee reported a bill that excluded banks that were not members of the Federal Reserve System. Senator Arthur Vandenberg rejected both bills because neither contained a ceiling on the guarantees. He proposed an amendment covering all banks, beginning by using a temporary fund and a $2,500 ceiling. It was passed as the Glass-Steagall Deposit Insurance Act in June 1933 with Steagall's amendment that the program would be managed by the new Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation. The bill was not supported by banks: Francis Sisson, then-president of the American Bankers Association, said that concept of banks paying into a fund that would insure individual banks against losses was "unsound, unscientific, unjust, and dangerous."

Led by Chicago banker Walter J. Cummings, Sr., the FDIC soon included almost all the country's 19,000 banking offices. Insurance started January 1, 1934. President Franklin D. Roosevelt was personally opposed to insurance because he thought it would protect irresponsible bankers, but yielded when he saw Congressional support was overwhelming.[citation needed] In early 1934, Roosevelt appointed Leo Crowley, a Wisconsin banker, as the second head of FDIC. Crowley, Roosevelt soon learned, did not have an unblemished record as a banker in Wisconsin. After some anguish, Roosevelt kept Crowley on and ignored his detractors. The outstanding public service of Leo Crowley was not generally known until 1996.

S&L and bank crisis of the 1980s

Federal deposit insurance received its first large-scale test in the late 1980s and early 1990s during the savings and loan crisis (which also affected commercial banks).

The brunt of the crisis fell upon a parallel institution, the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation (FSLIC), created to insure savings and loan institutions (S&Ls, also called thrifts). Due to a confluence of events, much of the S&L industry was insolvent, and many large banks were in trouble as well. The FSLIC became insolvent and merged into the FDIC. Thrifts are now overseen by the Office of Thrift Supervision, an agency that works closely with the FDIC and the Comptroller of the Currency. (Credit unions are insured by the National Credit Union Administration.) The primary legislative responses to the crisis were the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act of 1989 (FIRREA) and Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991 (FDICIA).

This crisis cost taxpayers an estimated $150 billion to resolve.

FDIC funds

There were two separate FDIC funds; one was the Bank Insurance Fund (BIF), and the other was the Savings Association Insurance Fund (SAIF). The latter was established after the savings & loans crisis of the 1980s. The existence of two separate funds for the same purpose led to banks attempting to shift from one fund to another, depending on the benefits each could provide. In the 1990s, SAIF premiums were at one point five times higher than BIF premiums; several banks attempted to qualify for the BIF, with some merging with institutions qualified for the BIF to avoid the higher premiums of the SAIF. This drove up the BIF premiums as well, resulting in a situation where both funds were charging higher premiums than necessary.

Then Chairman of the Federal Reserve Alan Greenspan was a critic of the system, saying that "We are, in effect, attempting to use government to enforce two different prices for the same item – namely, government-mandated deposit insurance. Such price differences only create efforts by market participants to arbitrage the difference." Greenspan proposed "to end this game and merge SAIF and BIF".

In February, 2006, President George W. Bush signed The Federal Deposit Insurance Reform Act of 2005 (the Reform Act) into law. The FDIRA contains technical and conforming changes to implement deposit insurance reform, as well as a number of study and survey requirements. Among the highlights of this law was merging the Bank Insurance Fund (BIF) and the Savings Association Insurance Fund (SAIF) into a new fund, the Deposit Insurance Fund (DIF). This change was made effective March 31, 2006. The FDIC maintains the DIF by assessing depository institutions an insurance premium. The amount each institution is assessed is based both on the balance of insured deposits as well as on the degree of risk the institution poses to the insurance fund.

At the end of 2007, the DIF had a balance of $52 billion. Bank failures typically represent a cost to the DIF because FDIC, as receiver of the failed institution, must liquidate assets that have declined substantially in value while at the same time making good on the institution's deposit obligations. In July 2008, IndyMac Bank failed and was placed into receivership. The failure was initially projected by the FDIC to cost the DIF between $4 billion and $8 billion, but shortly thereafter the FDIC revised its estimate upward to $8.9 billion. Due to the failures of IndyMac and other banks, the DIF fell in the second quarter of 2008 to $45.2 billion.. The decline in the insurance fund's balance caused the reserve ratio (fund's balance divided by the insured deposits) to fall to 1.01 percent as at 30 June 2008, down from 1.19 percent in the prior quarter. Once the ratio falls below below 1.15 percent, FDIC is required to develop a restoration plan to replenish the fund, which is expected to involve requiring higher contributions from banks which deal in riskier activities.