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让•梯若尔（Jean Tirole）教授，是世界著名的经济学大师。
梯若尔对经济学惊人的直觉，脑子里随时可以调出各种各样的经济学模型。他具有非凡的概括与综合能力，他总是能够把经济学的任何一个领域中最为本质的规律和最为重要的成果以最为简洁的经济学模型和语言表达出来，并整理成一个系统的理论框架。
纵观其20多年学术生涯中所作出的贡献，足令任何经济学家瞠目：300多篇高水平论文，11部专著，内容涉及经济学的任何重要领域———从宏观经济学到产业组织理论，从博弈论到激励理论，到国际金融，再到经济学与心理学的交叉研究，梯若尔都作出了开创性的贡献。智慧的光芒和热量洒向经济学每一个研究领域。梯若尔纵横驰骋，尽情挥洒，激情所至，堪称天下无敌。

梯若尔对经济学惊人的直觉，也是一般的经济学家望尘莫及的。这个瘦高身材的法国绅士，目光敏锐，衬衫的颜色永远高贵并跟外套和谐，脸上洋溢着不瘟不火的微笑，脑子里随时可以调出各种各样的经济学模型。
　　梯若尔具有非凡的概括与综合能力，他总是能够把经济学的任何一个领域中最为本质的规律和最为重要的成果以最为简洁的经济学模型和语言表达出来，并整理成一个系统的理论框架。
　　梯若尔仿佛专为经济学而生，被誉为当代“天才经济学家”。纵观其20多年学术生涯中所作出的贡献，足令任何经济学家瞠目：300多篇高水平论文，11部专著，内容涉及经济学的任何重要领域———从宏观经济学到产业组织理论，从博弈论到激励理论，到国际金融，再到经济学与心理学的交叉研究，梯若尔都作出了开创性的贡献。智慧的光芒和热量洒向经济学每一个研究领域。梯若尔纵横驰骋，尽情挥洒，激情所至，堪称天下无敌。
　　欧洲大陆自上世纪80年代兴起经济学复兴运动以来，最成功的当属法国图卢兹大学产业经济研究所（IDEI）。同许多法国经济学家一样，梯若尔深深地热爱着他的祖国，1988年，梯若尔从美国回到法国，和著名经济学家拉丰（已故）教授一起创办了享誉全球的法国产业经济研究所（IDEI），担任科研主任。并最终辞去了麻省理工学院的终身教授职位。他为法国乃至整个欧洲经济学的振兴做出了卓越的贡献。如今的IDEI已经成为经济学界公认的世界第一的产业经济学研究中心，也是欧洲的经济学学术中心。
　　梯若尔主要研究和教学领域： 公司财务、国际金融、企业理论、规制与激励、博弈论、宏观经济学。
　　梯若尔从当代经济学三个最前沿的研究领域博弈论、产业组织理论和激励理论的十几年融会贯通的研究中获得了经济学研究的真谛和“秘笈”，这个真谛就是作为一个经济学家的直觉——即透过纷繁复杂的经济学现象把握经济学本质规律的能力，而这个秘笈则是经济学研究的方法论。自90年代中期起，梯若尔开始以一个开拓者的姿态征服经济学的新领域：经济组织中的串谋问题(1992), 不完全契约理论(1999)，公司治理结构(2001) ， 公司金融理论(2002)，国际金融理论(2002)，以及最近完成的经济心理学(2002)。在上述每一个领域，梯若尔或以综述性论文的方式，或以专著的形式完成该领域的理论框架的建构，并指出进一步研究的方向，然后悄然转向另一个领域。梯若尔具有非凡的概括与综合能力，他总是能够把经济学的任何一个领域中最为本质的规律和最为重要的成果以最为简洁的经济学模型和语言表达出来，并整理成一个系统的理论框架。而梯若尔对经济学惊人的直觉，也是一般的经济学家望尘莫及的。他敏锐的洞察力和极快的反应能力使得一般的学者根本无法跟上他的思维，因而许多人都这样认为：“在梯若尔面前，我们如同白痴！”
　　梯若尔以他开创性的贡献赢得了国际盛誉：他荣获1993年欧洲经济学会的Yajo Jahnsson 奖。1998年被推选为世界经济计量学会主席，2001年当选为欧洲经济学会主席，并成为美国科学院外籍荣誉院士(1993)和美国经济学会外籍荣誉会员 (1993)。1996年慕黎黑经济研究中心，1999年产业组织协会杰出成员奖；布鲁塞尔自由大学荣誉博士等奖励。他是经济学界一致公认的未来的诺贝尔奖得主。
　　让·梯若尔的学术研究与贡献
　　凭天赋三年成权威
　　梯若尔继承了法国学者重视人文学科的传统，再加上深厚的数学功底，很快就显示出研究经济学的卓越天赋。他当时主要研究宏观经济学和金融学，并于1982年和1985年在最权威的Econometrica(经济计量学杂志)发表了两篇经典论文：《理性预期下投机行为的可能性》和《资产泡沫和世代交叠模型》，这两篇论文奠定了他在该领域的权威地位。
　　新产业组织理论：在学界产生革命性影响
　　此后，梯若尔转向了当时正在兴起的产业组织理论，他师从博弈论大师马斯金(Eric Maskin)，这使他熟练掌握了博弈论。
　　这门现代经济分析的锐利武器。梯若尔将博弈论和信息经济学的基本方法和分析框架应用于产业组织理论，开始构建新的框架，并用其分析解决产业结构调整中出现的许多新问题。
　　1988年，梯若尔代表作之一《产业组织理论》出版，标志着一个新理论框架的形成。自1970 年代以来，博弈论方法的引入使产业组织理论发生了革命性变化，但在本书之前，这些新的理论模型仅散见于各种期刊，尚未出现一本教科书，梯若尔《产业组织理论》是第一本用博弈论范式写成的教科书，是研究企业行为的 博弈论专著。
　　梯若尔在书中引用的许多文献只是在本书出版数年后才公开发表，这使得本书的内容在今天仍具有较强的“前瞻性”。10多年来，该书一直作为世界著名大学研究生的权威教本，广为流传，历久不衰。须知，从涉足产业组织理论到成为该理论的权威，梯若尔仅用了三年时间。
　　产业组织理论是近年来经济学最活跃、成果最丰富的领域之一。产业组织理论以市场与企业为研究对象，从市场角度研究企业行为或从企业角度研究市场结构。
　　作为一种完整而系统的理论体系，产业组织理论的出现是与新古典的微观经济理论在解释垄断或不完全竞争问题上的失败分不开的，或者从实践看，产业组织是伴随本世纪以来大型制造业公司的迅猛涌现以后才出现的。20世纪30年代以后，以哈佛大学为基地的正统产业组织理论基本形成，理论界称为哈佛学派。哈佛学派认为，结构、行为、绩效之间存在着因果关系（SCP范式），即市场结构决定企业行为，企业行为决定市场运行的经济绩效。所以，为了获得理想的市场绩效，最重要的是通过公共政策来调整不合理的市场结构。
　　产业组织理论引起了越来越多的世界一流理论经济学家们的注意和兴趣。他们不断地加入研究的行列。上世纪80年代前后，以梯若尔为代表的经济学家将博弈论和信息经济学的基本方法和分析框架引入产业组织理论的研究领域，对产业组织理论产生了革命性影响。
　　新产业组织理论的特点可以归纳为三个主要方面：从重视市场结构的研究转向重视市场行为的研究；突破了传统产业组织理论单向、静态的研究框架，建立了双向的、动态的研究框架；博弈论的引入，意味着对传统的由市场机制决定的瓦尔拉均衡可行性的怀疑，如现代大公司可通过许多非市场的制度安排，如合谋、内部整合、组织结构调整等来解决问题，而不依靠市场。
　　]《博弈论》
　　从1991出版之日起，梯若尔和弗登博格合著的《博弈论》便成为博弈论领域最具权威性的研究生教材，为美国各个高校经济学系的博士课程所采用。作为整个博弈理论中最为经典、与经济学中理性人假设最一脉相承、也是应用最为广泛的理论，非合作博弈是博弈理论中最为重要的部分。书中涵盖了非合作博弈的全部重要内容，不仅包括策略式博弈、纳什均衡、子博弈完美性、重复博弈以及不完全信息博弈等常规内容，而且还包括马尔可夫均衡这样的非常规内容。11年来无人超越，对世界著名大学研究生的博弈论教育产生了重要影响。 时至今日，它仍然是博弈论领域中最前沿的教科书之一。
　　新规制经济学：破解垄断行业竞争与规制密码
　　自1980年代中期始，梯若尔和拉丰(Jean-JacquesLaffont)共同开创了激励理论的一个最新的应用领域———新规制经济学，并以两本经典著作《政府采购和规制中的激励理论》(1993)和《电信竞争》(2000)完成了该理论框架的构建，确立了其在该领域的开创者地位。
　　20世纪80年代，世界各地在电信、电力、铁路、煤气、自来水等自然垄断产业中掀起了“管制改革”的浪潮，放松管制、引入竞争、产权私有，由垄断走向竞争已成为世界各地自然垄断产业市场化改革的主导趋势。
　　传统的规制方法主要有两种：基于服务成本定价的服务成本规制方法和基于拉姆齐定价规则的拉姆齐 -布瓦德规制方法。由于忽略了规制中存在的信息不对称问题而使得它们无法提供正当的激励。一般地，被规制的垄断企业拥有有关运营成本的私人信息，并且总是有积极性隐瞒这种信息，因而规制方很难获得精确的成本信息。在这种环境下，上述两种方法会带来极大的激励扭曲。
　　管制改革的实践，迫切需要新的产业管制理论的出现。梯若尔和拉丰开始探索将信息经济学与激励理论的基本思想和方法应用于垄断行业的规制理论的道路。
　　在批判传统规制理论的基础上，他们创建了一个关于激励性规制的一般框架，结合了公共经济学与产业组织理论的基本思想以及信息经济学与机制设计理论的基本方法，成功地解决了不对称信息下的规制问题。
　　梯若尔和拉丰于1993年出版的著作《政府采购与规制中的激励理论》完成了新规制经济学理论框架的构建，并奠定了他们在这一领域的学术领导者地位。
　　梯若尔和拉丰将新规制经济学的基本思想和方法应用于垄断行业的规制问题，分析各种规制政策的激励效应，并建立了一个规范的评价体系。2000年，作为对十几年垄断行业规制理论与政策研究的总结，他和拉丰合著的《电信竞争》一书，为电信及网络产业的竞争与规制问题的分析和政策的制订提供了一个最为权威的理 论依据。
　　10多年来，梯若尔从当代经济学三个最前沿领域———博弈论、产业组织理论和激励理论的研究中，获知研究经济学的真谛：要有经济学家的直觉———即透过纷繁复杂的经济现象把握经济学本质的能力，时刻讲求经济学研究的方法论。凭此，自1990年代中期始，梯若尔不断在经济学的各个新领域拓荒，硕果累累。
　　建模型解串谋难题
　　1992年，在国际经济计量学会第六届世界大会上，梯若尔提交论文《经济组织中的串谋问题》。串谋与勾结是所有的组织或机构中普遍存在的现象，早已为政治学家和社会学家所关注。串谋与勾结会给社会福利带来损失，因而如何在制度设计中解决串谋问题，一直成为政治家和学者们不懈努力的目标之一，并在人类的制度 文化中占有重要地位。
　　然而令人惊讶的是，这个重要现象长期以来却一直未能受到主流经济学家的重视。作为社会科学理论的皇冠明珠，主流经济学的理论与实践取得过令人瞩目的成就，但它在制度分析方面尤其是对于串谋现象的漠不关心和无所作为，无法令人满意。究其根源，仍然是主流经济学家对于新古典主义的完备市场假设这个教条的坚定信念。
　　在产业组织理论和规制经济学等诸多领域，串谋现象造成了产业政策和政府规制政策的严重扭曲，这一点即使在司法体系十分完备的欧美国家都普遍存在(如美国的安然公司和世界电信与安达信公司合谋做假账等案件)，更不用说许多处于制度转型时期的发展中国家。
　　梯若尔这篇综述性论文建立在他于1986年发表在《法、经济学与组织杂志》上的基本框架——— 多代理人模型上，它指出了研究串谋问题的重要性并提供了基本方法论。在该论文中，梯若尔提出了著名的“防范串谋原理”：为了避免串谋带来组织效率的损失，对于一般性组织，委托人总可以设计一组新的机制或契约，通过转移支付等手段，使得代理人的收益超过他参与串谋的收益，从而抵消了代理人参与串谋的积极性。
　　研究串谋问题的另一个理论上的困难，来自于代理人串谋时所达成的支契约的可执行性。在法律上，一般地，这种支契约是非法的，因而很难将其纳入到契约理论的框架中。
　　梯若尔则在非合作博弈的框架下，运用他所擅长的声誉模型和重复博弈模型很好地解决了这个难题。他指出，串谋往往发生在具有长期合作关系的组织中，这种长期关系使得代理人在串谋时更重视合作的声誉以及未来的收益，因而保证了串谋契约是自持的。
　　梯若尔这篇论文建立了串谋理论的基本框架，在这个框架基础上，图卢兹学派，尤其是拉丰和马赫蒂摩(Laffontand Martimort)所作的突出贡献使其成为完整的理论体系。
　　不完全契约之争：梯若尔成为争论终结者
　　1999年，梯若尔在Econometrica发表了《不完全契约理论：我们究竟该站在什么立场上》。这篇论文被认为是对当时轰动整个学术界的不完全契约理论之争的“终结者之声”，同时也是关于该理论最经典的综述。
　　契约是一组承诺的集合，这些承诺是签约方在签约时作出的，并且预期在未来(契约到期日)能够被兑现。完全契约是指，这些承诺的集合完全包括了双方在未来预期的事件发生时所有的权利和义务。但在现实中，绝大部分契约都是不完全的，这是因为签约方在事前对未来所作的预期仅仅是基于双方的主观评估，未来所面临的不确定性在本质上是不可预期的。不完全契约面临的核心问题是，由于签约方的机会主义行为造成的资源配置的帕累托无效。
　　不完全契约理论之争由来已久，1985年，威廉姆森(Oliver Williamson)在其经典名著《资本主义的经济制度》中指出，由于契约的不完备性所带来的交易成本，是导致资源配置效率低下的重要原因之一，而格罗斯曼(S.Grossmanan）和哈特（ O.Hart）（986)在其经典论文中指出，产权，尤其是剩余索取权的合理配置，可以消除不完全契约所带来的交易成本，并且这也是用企业内部交易代替市场交易的根本原因。但随着人们对不完全契约本质的深入揭示以及机制设计理论的迅速发展，许多学者研究得出，通过设计一些激励相容的机制，可以消除不完全契约的交易成本，从而可以在契约理论的框架内解决这一经典难题。
　　1999年，著名的《经济研究评论》杂志在其66卷第一期以专辑形式掀起了不完全契约理论之争的高潮。以哈特和摩尔(Hart＆Moore1999)为代表的产权理论学派认为，当不确定性下的自然状态足够复杂时，从本质上不存在一个可行的机制来实现帕累托有效的资源配置，因而只有通过合理地配置产权等制度安排来恢复资源配置的效率。这就是哈特-摩尔-西格尔（Hart-Moore-Segal）(1999)所证明的“不可能定理”。
　　而以梯若尔和马斯金为代表的机制设计学派却对上述结论不以为然，他们在《不可预见的偶然性与不完全契约》论文中，运用机制设计理论的最新成果证明，不可预见的偶然性所造成的契约的不完全性，并不构成资源配置无效率的本质障碍，在当事人的效用函数不是非常限制性的情形下(即当事人没有很怪的偏好)，我们可以设计出一个激励相容的机制，实现帕累托有效的配置。
　　这就是马斯金-梯若尔Maskin-Tirole提出的“可能定理”。
　　某些学者指责“Maskin-Tirole机制过于复杂因而无法在现实中应用”，梯若尔则针锋相对地指出，所谓机制的复杂与否必须放到具体的应用范围中去讨论，如果机制的设计与实施的成本低于它所带来的收益，这种机制就是可行的。
　　事实上，在现实运用中，涉及到大规模项目的招标与拍卖机制往往设计得非常复杂，以至于只有少数专家才能掌握。另一方面，产权配置，作为一种强制性的制度安排，它所带来的交易成本往往非常高昂，并且容易被低估甚至忽略，而制度安排的锁定效应会导致长期交易的无效率。与此相比，机制，作为一种自持的契约安排，其交易成本显然要低得多。
　　出新著创金融新论
　　2002年，梯若尔出版著作《金融危机、流动性与国际货币体制》，在国际金融学界引起巨大反响。以往针对金融危机的政策建议大都通过“adhoc”(缺乏微观基础)的模型推导而来，梯若尔认为这些建议只看到了问题的症状，而没有看到深层原因，资本自由化并不能医治百病。在该书中，梯若尔从最基本的假设出发，考虑了国际金融体系下贷款人和借款人的关系对流动性和风险的影响，强调了市场失灵对于国际金融危机的重要影响。
　　国际货币基金组织首席经济学家罗果夫(Kenneth Rogoff)教授说：“这是第一本为国际金融问题提供了全面的严格的理论基础的著作，分析简洁，文字优雅，富有洞察力，它让我们重新审视国际金融机构的作用和缺点。”
　　公司财务领域的研究在过去二十年有了长足的进展，但传统公司财务理论的缺陷一目了然：一方面，局限于对称信息框架下研究公司的财务结构对公司价值的影响，其代表性成果为莫迪里亚尼-米勒定理(简称MM定理)，但MM定理所要求的条件过于理想化，使得该理论在现实应用中受到很大限制，也无法解决公司财务领域出现的一些实际难题；另一方面，众多令人眼花缭乱的模型互相独立，不成体系，令人困惑。
　　2002年底，梯若尔出版了《公司财务理论》，在公司金融理论领域具有里程碑式的意义―――第一部一统江湖之作。梯若尔令人耳目一新、驾轻就熟地给一个原本支离破碎和复杂得令人沮丧的领域带来了无可置疑的统一和简约之美。他以公司金融和契约理论的联系统一全书，在不对称信息框架下重新改写了公司财务理论，运用对策论、激励理论、产业组织理论的方法，重点讨论了公司治理结构、控制权分配、流动性管理、监管与收购等问题，给公司财务理论界定了更广阔的研究范围和新的研究重点与方向。
　　在上述每一个领域，梯若尔或以综述性论文的方式，或以专著的方式完成该领域的理论框架的建构，并指出进一步研究的方向，然后悄然转向另一个领域。最近，他把目光又投向了经济学更深层次的基础性问题——经济心理学的研究，目前已完成了5篇高水平的学术论文。普林斯顿大学迪克希特(Avinash Dixit)教授说：“梯若尔的经济学直觉是经济学理论价值的最完美的体现，他把智慧光芒的热量撒向他所触及的每一个领域。”谁会知道，梯若尔的下一个方向会在哪里？
　　让·梯若尔与中国
　　梯若尔教授非常关心中国的经济学教育，他曾多次到中国来讲学。2002 年12月，应武汉大学高级研究中心主任邹恒甫教授之邀，作为法国产业经济研究所和武汉大学高级研究中心双向交流的一个重要项目，梯若尔教授曾在武汉大学高级研究中心系统地讲授公司金融理论和国际金融理论，这一讲座代表了该领域最高水准。
　　让·梯若尔的重要著作
　　纵观让·梯若尔20多年学术生涯中所作出的贡献，足令任何经济学家瞠目：300多篇高水平论文，11部专著，智慧的光芒和热量洒向经济学每一个研究领域。仅让·梯若尔2005年在顶级杂志上发表的论文数目比欧洲其他所有的学校加起来还多。
　　其主要著作有：
　　1982年和1985年在最权威的Econometrica(经济计量学杂志)发表了两篇经典论文：《理性预期下投机行为的可能性》和《资产泡沫和世代交 叠模型》，这两篇论文奠定了他在该领域的权威地位。
　　1986年发表在《法、经济学与组织杂志》上的基本框架——多代理人模型上，它指出了研究串谋问题的重要性并提供了基本方法论。
　　1988年，他的代表作之一——《产业组织理论》出版，标志着产业经济学新的理论框架的完成。在此后的十几年中，这本书一直作为世界著名大学经济系研究生 的权威教程而广为流传，至今无人超越。
　　1991年，Tirole与弗登伯格(Drew Fudenberg)合著《博弈论》出版。该书以其关于博弈论体系和发展方向的把握，立刻成为博弈论领域最权威的高级教程，11年来无人超越，对世界著名大学研究生的博弈论教育产生了重要影响。
　　1992年，在国际经济计量学会第六届世界大会上，Tirole提交论文《经济组织中的串谋问题》。因而如何在制度设计中解决串谋问题，一直成为政治家和学者们不 懈努力的目标之一，并在人类的制度文化中占有重要地位。
　　1993年梯若尔和拉丰出版的著作《政府采购与规制中的激励理论》完成了新规制经济学理论框架的构建，并奠定了他们在这一领域的学术领导者地位。
　　1991 －1998年，梯若尔确立了在经济学领域中的领导地位。在这一时期，梯若尔先后发表了《对策论》（合著）、《经济组织中的串谋问题》、《不完全契约理论》 等经典论文。
　　1999年，Tirole在Econometrica发表了《不完全契约理论：我们究竟该站在什么立场上》。这篇论文被认为是对当时轰动整个学术界的不完全契约理论之争的“终结者之声”，同时也是关于该理论最经典的综述。
　　2000年，作为对十几年垄断行业规制理论与政策研究的总结，他和拉丰合著的《电信竞争》一书，为电信及网络产业的竞争与规制问题的分析和政策的制订提供了一个最为权威的理论依据。
　　2002年，Tirole出版著作《金融危机、流动性与国际货币体制》，在国际金融学界引起巨大反响。
　　2002年底，梯若尔出版了《公司财务理论》，在公司金融理论领域具有里程碑式的意义。

Research Interests
Industrial Organization
Regulation
Organization Theory
Game Theory
Finance
Macroeconomics
Psychology


Professional experiences
Current positions
Ingénieur général des Ponts et Chaussées
1992 - Visiting Professor MIT
1992 - Scientific director, Institut d'Économie Industrielle
1995 - Directeur d'Etudes cumulant, EHESS
2008 - Member of the Conseil d'Analyse Économique of the Prime Minister
2009 - Chairman of the Board of Directors, Toulouse School of Economics

Former positions
1981 - 1984 Researcher; CERAS, École Nationale des Ponts et Chaussées
1984 - 1991 Professor of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
1998 President, Econometric Society
1999 - 2006 Member of the Conseil d'Analyse Économique of the Prime Minister
2001 President, European Economic Association
2006 - 2009 Fellow of the Haut Conseil Sciences et Technology
2007 - 2009 Director, Toulouse School of Economics

Education
1976 Engineer, École Polytechnique
1976 Diplôme d'Étude Approfondie, Decision Mathematics, Paris IX -Dauphine
1978 Engineer, École Nationale des Ponts et Chaussées
1978 Docteur de 3ème Cycle, Decision Mathematics, Paris IX - Dauphine
1981 Ph.D., Massachusetts Institute of Technology

Grants and awards
1985 - 1987 Sloan Fellowship
1988 - 1989 John Simon Guggenheim Memorial Fellowship
1989 Doctorat Honoris Causa, Université Libre de Bruxelles
1993 Foreign Honorary Member, American Academy of Arts and Sciences
1993 Foreign Honorary Member, American Economic Association
1993 Yrjo Jahnsson prize of the European Economic Association
1996 Center for Economic Studies Prize, Munich
1997 Public Utility Research Center Distinguished Service Award, University of Florida, Gainesville
1998 John von Neumann Award, Rajk Lazlo College for Advanced Studies, Budapest University
1999 Distinguished Fellow Award, Industrial Organization Society
2002 Médaille d'argent, Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique
2002 Lauréat du Prix Dargélos de l'Ecole Polytechnique
2004 Institute of Scientific Information-Thomson Price Winner in Economics
2007 Chevalier de la légion d'honneur
2007 Honorary doctorate degree, London Business School
2007 Honorary doctorate degree, HEC Montreal
2007 Gold medal, CNRS
2007 Gold medal, city of Toulouse
2008 (Inaugural) Frontiers of Knowledge Award of the BBVA Foundation
2008 Cercle d'Oc Prize
2010 European Research Council Grant
2010 CME Group - Mathematical Sciences Research Institute Prize in Innovation Quantitative Applications

Drafts
Book Draft
Inside and Outside Liquidity, MIT Press, August 2010.
(with Bengt Holmström)
[Forthcoming]
Work in progress
Articles in working paper series
"Bubbly Liquidity", IDEI Working Paper, n. 577, October 2009, revised January 2010.
(with Emmanuel Farhi)
[ Full text (PDF file) ]
"Collective Moral Hazard, Maturity Mismatch and Systemic Bailouts", IDEI Working Paper, n. 571, June 2009, revised October 2010.
(with Emmanuel Farhi)
[ Full text (PDF file) ]
"Leçons d'une crise", TSE Notes/Notes TSE, n. 1, December 2008.
[ Full text (PDF file, 801 Kb) ]
"Fear of Rejection? Tiered Certification and Transparency", IDEI Working Paper, n. 534, October 2008, revised janvier 2010.
(with Emmanuel Farhi and Josh Lerner)
[ Full text (PDF file, 409 Kb) ]
"Speculative Attacks and Risk Management", IDEI Working Paper, n. 438, August 2006.
(with Parag A. Pathak)
[ Full text (PDF file, 347 Kb) ]
Mimeos
Materialistic Genius and Market Power: Uncovering the best innovations, August 15, 2010.
(with Glen Weyl (Harvard University))
[ Full text (PDF file, 978 Kb) ]
Regional Initiatives and the Cost of Delaying Binding Climate Change Agreements, May 2010.
(with Julien Beccherle)
[ Full text (PDF file, 255 Kb) ]
Overcoming Adverse Selection: How Public Intervention Can Restore Market Functioning, May 2010.
[ Full text (PDF file) ]
Collective Moral Hazard, Maturity Mismatch and Systemic Bailouts.
(with Emmanuel Farhi)
Forthcoming
Articles in refereed journals
"Identity, Morals and Taboos: Beliefs as Assets", The Quarterly Journal of Economics, June 2010.
(with Roland Benabou)
[ Full text (PDF file, 541 Kb) ]
"Illiquidity and All Its Friends", Journal of Economic Literature, February 2010.
[Forthcoming]
[ Full text (PDF file) ]
"Must Take Cards: Merchant Discounts and Avoided Costs", Journal of the European Economic Association, 2009.
(with Jean-Charles Rochet)
[Forthcoming]
Publications
Articles in refereed journals
"From Pigou to Extended Liability: On the Optimal Taxation of Externalities under Imperfect Financial Markets", The Review of Economic Studies, vol. 77, n. 2, April 2010, p. 697-729. doi:10.1111/j.1467-937X.2009.00585.x.
[ Full text (PDF file, 8 Mb) ]
"Individual and Corporate Social Responsibility", Economica, vol. 77, n. 305, 2010, p. 1-19.
(with Roland Benabou)
[ Full text (PDF file) ]
"Over My Dead Body: Bargaining and the Price of Dignity", American Economic Review, vol. 99, n. 2, Papers and Proceedings, May 2009, p. 459-465.
(with Roland Benabou)
"Leverage and the Central Banker's Put", American Economic Review, vol. 99, n. 2, Papers and Proceedings, May 2009, p. 589-593.
(with Emmanuel Farhi)
"Cognition and Incomplete Contracts", American Economic Review, vol. 99, n. 1, March 2009, p. 265-294.
[ Full text (PDF file, 265 Kb) ]
"Tying in Two-Sided Markets and the Honor All Cards Rule", International Journal of Industrial Organization, vol. 26, n. 6, November 2008, p. 1333-1347.
(with Jean-Charles Rochet)
[ Full text ]
"Public-Private Partnerships and Government Spending Limits", International Journal of Industrial Organization, vol. 26, n. 2, March 2008, p. 412-420.
(with Eric Maskin)
[ Full text (PDF file, 152 Kb) ]
"Consensus Building: How to Persuade a Group", American Economic Review, vol. 97, n. 5, December 2007, p. 1877-1900.
(with Bernard Caillaud)
[ Full text (PDF file, 355 Kb) ]
"Financing and Access in Cooperatives", International Journal of Industrial Organization, vol. 25, n. 5, October 2007, p. 1061-1088.
(with Patrick Rey)
[ Full text (PDF file, 364 Kb) ]
"The Optimal Design of Unemployment Insurance and Employment Protection: A First Pass", Journal of the European Economic Association, vol. 6, n. 1, 2007, p. 45-77.
(with Olivier Jean Blanchard)
[ Full text (PDF file, 286 Kb) ]
"The Rules of Standard Setting Organizations: an Empirical Analysis", The RAND Journal of Economics, vol. 38, n. 4, 2007, p. 905-930.
(with Benjamin Chiao and Josh Lerner)
[ Full text (PDF file, 291 Kb) ]
"Reliability and Competitive Electricity Markets", The RAND Journal of Economics, vol. 38, n. 1, 2007, p. 60-84.
(with Paul Joskow)
[ Full text (PDF file, 926 Kb) ]
"Public Policy Toward Patent Pools", Innovation Policy and the Economy, n. 8, 2007, p. 157-186.
(with Josh Lerner)
"The Design of Patent Pools: The Determinants of Licensing Rules", The RAND Journal of Economics, vol. 38, n. 3, 2007, p. 610-625.
(with Josh Lerner and Marcin Strojwas)
[ Full text (PDF file, 219 Kb) ]
"Belief in a Just World and Redistributive Politics", The Quarterly Journal of Economics, vol. 121, n. 2, May 2006, p. 699-746.
(with Roland Benabou)
[ Full text (PDF file, 467 Kb) ]
"Incentives and Prosocial Behavior", American Economic Review, vol. 96, n. 5, 2006, p. 1652-1678.
(with Roland Benabou)
"Retail Electricity Competition", The RAND Journal of Economics, vol. 37, n. 4, 2006, p. 799-815.
(with Paul Joskow)
"A Model of Forum Shopping", American Economic Review, vol. 96, 2006, p. 1091-1113.
(with Josh Lerner)
"Two-Sided Markets: A Progress Report", The RAND Journal of Economics, vol. 35, n. 3, 2006, p. 645-667.
(with Jean-Charles Rochet)
[ Full text (PDF file) ]
"The Dynamics of Open Source Contributors", American Economic Review, vol. 96, n. 2, 2006, p. 114-118.
"Modes of Communication", Journal of Political Economy, vol. 113, n. 6, December 2005, p. 1217-1238.
(with Mathias Dewatripont)
"Self-Control in Peer Groups", Journal of Economic Theory, vol. 123, n. 2, August 2005, p. 105-134.
(with Marco Battaglini and Roland Benabou)
[ ScienceDirect© (PDF file) ]
"Merchant Transmission Investment", The Journal of Industrial Economics, vol. 53, n. 2, June 2005, p. 233-264.
(with Paul Joskow)
[ Article ©Journal (PDF file, 224 Kb) ]
"Certifying New Technologies", Journal of the European Economic Association, vol. 3, n. 2-3, April-May 2005, p. 734-744.
(with Emmanuel Farhi and Josh Lerner)
"The Scope of Open Source Licensing", The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, vol. 21, April 2005, p. 20-56.
(with Josh Lerner)
"The Economics of Technology Sharing: Open Source and Beyond", Journal of Economic Perspectives, vol. 19, n. 2, Spring, 2005, p. 99-120.
(with Josh Lerner)
"The Analysis of Tying Cases: A Primer", Competition Policy International, vol. 1, n. 1, Spring 2005.
[ Article ©Journal (PDF file, 2 Mb) ]
"The Politician and The Judge: Accountability in Government", American Economic Review, vol. 94, n. 4, September 2004, p. 1034-1054.
(with Eric Maskin)
"Willpower and Personal Rules", Journal of Political Economy, vol. 112, n. 4, August 2004, p. 848-886.
(with Roland Benabou)
"Efficient Patent Pools", American Economic Review, vol. 94, n. 3, June 2004, p. 691-711.
(with Josh Lerner)
"Redesigning the Employment Protection System", De Economist, vol. 152, n. 1, Springer Netherlands, March 2004, p. 1-20.
(with Olivier Jean Blanchard)
[ Full text (PDF file, 199 Kb) ]
"Essential Facility Financing and Market Structure", Journal of Public Economics, vol. 88, n. 3-4, March 2004, p. 667-694.
(with Bernard Caillaud)
[ ScienceDirect© ]
"Exit Options in Corporate Finance: Liquidity versus Incentives", Review of Finance, vol. 8, n. 3, 2004, p. 327-353.
(with Philippe Aghion and Patrick Bolton)
[ Article ©Journal (PDF file) ]
"On the Receiver Pays Principle", The RAND Journal of Economics, vol. 35, n. 1, Spring 2004, p. 85-110.
(with Doh-Shin Jeon and Jean-Jacques Laffont)
"Inefficient Foreign Borrowing: A Dual-and Common-Agency Perspective", American Economic Review, vol. 93, n. 5, December 2003, p. 1678-1702.
[ Jstor© ]
"Intrinsic and Extrinsic Motivation", The Review of Economic Studies, vol. 70, n. 3, July 2003, p. 489-520.
(with Roland Benabou)
"Platform Competition in Two-Sided Markets", Journal of the European Economic Association, vol. 1, n. 4, June 2003, p. 990-1029.
(with Jean-Charles Rochet)
[ Full text (PDF file, 405 Kb) | Abstract (PDF file, 86 Kb) ]
"On Non-Exclusive Membership in Competing Joint Ventures", The RAND Journal of Economics, vol. 34, n. 1, Spring 2003, p. 43-62.
(with Jerry A. Hausman and Gregory K. Leonard)
[ Jstor© ]
"Internet Interconnection and the Off-Net-Cost Pricing Principle", The RAND Journal of Economics, vol. 34, n. 2, 2003, p. 370-390.
(with Jean-Jacques Laffont, Scott Marcus and Patrick Rey)
[ Full text (PDF file, 370 Kb) | Abstract (PDF file, 37 Kb) ]
"An Economic Analysis of the Determination of Interchange Fees in Payment Card Systems", The Review of Network Economics, vol. 2, n. 2, 2003, p. 69-79.
(with Jean-Charles Rochet)
"Parties as Political Intermediaries", The Quarterly Journal of Economics, vol. 117, n. 4, November 2002, p. 1453-1489.
(with Bernard Caillaud)
"Self Confidence and Personal Motivation", The Quarterly Journal of Economics, vol. 117, n. 3, August 2002, p. 871-915.
(with Roland Benabou)
[ Article ©Journal (PDF file, 374 Kb) ]
"Some Simple Economics of Open Source", The Journal of Industrial Economics, vol. 50, n. 2, June 2002, p. 197-234.
(with Josh Lerner)
"Domestic and International Supply of Liquidity", American Economic Review, vol. 92, n. 2, May 2002, p. 42-45.
(with Bengt Holmström)
[ Jstor© ]
"Rational Irrationality: Some Economics of Self-Management", European Economic Review, vol. 46, n. 4-5, Elsevier, April 2002, p. 633-655.
[ ScienceDirect© (PDF file) ]
"Cooperation among Competitors: Some Economics of Payment Card Associations", The RAND Journal of Economics, vol. 33, n. 4, 2002, p. 1-22.
(with Jean-Charles Rochet)
[ Jstor© ]
"LAPM: A Liquidity-Based Asset Pricing Model", The Journal of Finance, vol. 56, n. 5, (Smith Breeden Award 2002), October 2001, p. 1837-1867.
(with Bengt Holmström)
[ Jstor© ]
"Markov Perfect Equilibrium I: Observable Actions", Journal of Economic Theory, vol. 100, n. 2, October 2001, p. 191-219.
(with Eric Maskin)
[ ScienceDirect© (PDF file) ]
"Internet Peering", American Economic Review, vol. 91, n. 2, May 2001, p. 287-291.
(with Jean-Jacques Laffont, Scott Marcus and Patrick Rey)
[ Jstor© ]
"The Open Source Movement: Key Research Questions", European Economic Review, vol. 45, n. 4-6, Elsevier, May 2001, p. 819-826.
(with Josh Lerner)
[ ScienceDirect© (PDF file) ]
"Corporate Governance", Econometrica, vol. 69, n. 1, January 2001, p. 1-35.
[ Jstor© ]
"Le Risque Régulatoire", Risques - Les Cahiers de l'Assurance, vol. 46, 2001, p. 86-89.
(with Jean-Jacques Laffont)
"Connectivity in the Commercial Internet", The Journal of Industrial Economics, vol. 48, n. 4, December 2000, p. 433-472.
(with Jacques Crémer and Patrick Rey)
[ Jstor© ]
"Pricing a Network Good to Deter Entry", The Journal of Industrial Economics, vol. 48, n. 4, December 2000, p. 373-390.
(with Drew Fudenberg)
[ Jstor© ]
"Liquidity and Risk Management", Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, vol. 32, n. 3, August 2000, p. 295-319.
(with Bengt Holmström)
[ Jstor© ]
"L'infrastructure Institutionnelle de la Politique de Concurrence", Revue d'Économie du Développement, n. 1-2, June 2000, p. 123-132.
"Multitask Agency Problems: Focus and Task Clustering", European Economic Review, vol. 44, n. 4-6, Elsevier, May 2000, p. 869-877.
(with Mathias Dewatripont and Ian Jewitt)
[ ScienceDirect© (PDF file) ]
"Global Price Caps and the Regulation of Access", Brazilian Review of Econometrics, vol. 20, n. 1, May 2000, p. 115-146.
(with Jean-Jacques Laffont)
"Some Reflections on Open Source Software", Communications & Strategies, n. 40, IDATE, Montpellier, Special Issue 4th Quarter 2000, p. 139-159.
(with Jacques Crémer and Eloic Peyrache)
"Customer Poaching and Brand Switching", The RAND Journal of Economics, vol. 31, n. 4, Winter 2000, p. 634-657.
(with Drew Fudenberg)
[ Jstor© ]
"Transmission Rights and Market Power on Electric Power Networks", The RAND Journal of Economics, vol. 31, n. 3, Autumn 2000, p. 450-487.
(with Paul Joskow)
[ Jstor© ]
"El Gobierno Corporativo", Economia (Pontifical Catholic University of Peru), vol. 22, n. 44, December 1999, p. 9-60.
"Incomplete Contracts: Where Do We Stand?", Econometrica, vol. 67, n. 4, July 1999, p. 741-781.
[ Jstor© ]
"Report of the President", Econometrica, vol. 67, n. 3, The Econometric Society Annual Reports: 1998, May 1999, p. 699-704.
[ Jstor© ]
"Party Governance and Ideological Biais", European Economic Review, vol. 43, n. 4-6, Elsevier, April 1999, p. 779-789.
(with Bernard Caillaud)
[ ScienceDirect© ]
"Advocates", Journal of Political Economy, vol. 107, n. 1, February 1999, p. 1-39.
(with Mathias Dewatripont)
[ Jstor© ]
"Concessions, Concurrence et Incitations", Revue d'économie financière, n. 51, January 1999, p. 79-92.
"The Economics of Career Concerns, I: Comparing Information Structure", The Review of Economic Studies, vol. 66, n. 1, Special Issue: Contracts, January 1999, p. 183-198.
(with Mathias Dewatripont and Ian Jewitt)
[ Jstor© ]
"The Economics of Career Concerns, II: Applications to Missions and Accountability of Government Agencies", The Review of Economic Studies, vol. 66, n. 1, Special Issue: Contracts, January 1999, p. 199-217.
(with Mathias Dewatripont and Ian Jewitt)
[ Jstor© ]
"Unforeseen Contingencies and Incomplete Contracts", The Review of Economic Studies, vol. 66, n. 1, Special Issue: Contracts, January 1999, p. 83-114.
(with Eric Maskin)
[ Jstor© ]
"Two Remarks on the Property-Rights Literature", The Review of Economic Studies, vol. 66, n. 1, Special Issue: Contracts, January 1999, p. 139-149.
(with Eric Maskin)
[ Jstor© ]
"Private and Public Supply of Liquidity", Journal of Political Economy, vol. 106, n. 1, February 1998, p. 1-40.
(with Bengt Holmström)
[ Jstor© ]
"Upgrades, Tradeins, and Buybacks", The RAND Journal of Economics, vol. 29, n. 2, Summer 1998, p. 235-258.
(with Drew Fudenberg)
[ Jstor© ]
"Network Competition: I. Overview and Nondiscriminatory Pricing", The RAND Journal of Economics, vol. 29, n. 1, Spring 1998, p. 1-37.
(with Jean-Jacques Laffont and Patrick Rey)
[ Jstor© ]
"Network Competition: II. Price Discrimination", The RAND Journal of Economics, vol. 29, n. 1, Spring 1998, p. 38-56.
(with Jean-Jacques Laffont and Patrick Rey)
[ Jstor© ]
"Financial Intermediation, Loanable Funds and the Real Sector", The Quarterly Journal of Economics, vol. 112, n. 3, August 1997, p. 663-691.
(with Bengt Holmström)
[ Jstor© ]
"Formal and Real Authority in Organizations", Journal of Political Economy, vol. 105, n. 1, February 1997, p. 1-29.
(with Philippe Aghion)
[ Jstor© ]
"Competition Between Telecommunications Operators", European Economic Review, vol. 41, n. 3-5, Elsevier, 1997, p. 701-711.
(with Jean-Jacques Laffont and Patrick Rey)
[ ScienceDirect© (PDF file) ]
"Analyse Économique de la Notion de Prix de Prédation", Revue Française d'Économie, vol. 12, 1997, p. 3-32.
(with Patrick Rey)
"Creating Competition through Interconnection: Theory and Practice", Journal of Regulatory Economics, vol. 10, n. 3, November 1996, p. 227-256.
(with Jean-Jacques Laffont)
[ Abstract ]
"Interbank Lending and Systemic Risk", Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, vol. 28, n. 4, November 1996, p. 733-762.
(with Jean-Charles Rochet)
[ Jstor© ]
"Controlling Risk in Payment Systems", Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, vol. 28, n. 4, November 1996, p. 832-862.
(with Jean-Charles Rochet)
[ Jstor© ]
"Pollution Permits and Compliance Strategies", Journal of Public Economics, vol. 62, n. 1, October 1996, p. 85-125.
(with Jean-Jacques Laffont)
[ ScienceDirect© (PDF file) ]
"Pollution Permits and Environmental Innovation", Journal of Public Economics, vol. 62, n. 1-2, October 1996, p. 127-140.
(with Jean-Jacques Laffont)
[ ScienceDirect© (PDF file) ]
"Biaised Principals as a Discipline Device", Japan and the World Economy, vol. 8, n. 2, June 1996, p. 195-206.
(with Mathias Dewatripont)
[ ScienceDirect© (PDF file) ]
"Modeling Aggregate Liquidity", American Economic Review, vol. 86, n. 2, Papers and Proceedings of the Hundredth and Eighth Annual Meeting of the American Economic Association, San Francisco, January 5-7, 1996, May 1996, p. 187-191.
(with Bengt Holmström)
[ Jstor© ]
"A Theory of Collective Reputations (with Applications to the Persistence of Corruption and to Firm Quality)", The Review of Economic Studies, vol. 63, n. 1, January 1996, p. 1-22.
[ Jstor© ]
"Some Implications of Growth for Organizational Form and Ownership Structure", European Economic Review, vol. 39, n. 3, Elsevier, April 1995, p. 440-456.
(with Philippe Aghion)
[ ScienceDirect© (PDF file) ]
"A Theory of Income and Dividend Smoothing Based on Incumbency Rents", Journal of Political Economy, vol. 103, n. 1, February 1995, p. 75-93.
(with Drew Fudenberg)
[ Jstor© ]
"Collusion et Théorie des Organisations", Revue d'Économie Industrielle, 1995, p. 247-286.
"Libéralisation et Charges d'Accès", Annales des Télécommunications, vol. 50, n. 2, Springer, Paris, 1995, p. 306-314.
(with Jean-Jacques Laffont)
"Les Idées Nouvelles sur l'Intégration Verticale : Un Guide Informel de l'Utilisateur", Annales des Télécommunications, vol. 50, Springer, Paris, 1995, p. 256-264.
"Structures d'Entreprise, R&D et Incitations", Annales des Télécommunications, vol. 50, Springer, Paris, 1995, p. 165-184.
"Access Pricing and Competition", European Economic Review, vol. 38, n. 9, Elsevier, December 1994, p. 1673-1710.
(with Jean-Jacques Laffont)
[ ScienceDirect© ]
"The Management of Innovation", The Quarterly Journal of Economics, vol. 109, n. 4, November 1994, p. 1185-1209.
(with Philippe Aghion)
[ Jstor© ]
"A Theory of Debt and Equity: Diversity of Securities and Manager-Shareholder Congruence", The Quarterly Journal of Economics, vol. 109, n. 4, November 1994, p. 1027-1054.
(with Mathias Dewatripont)
[ Jstor© ]
"Western Prudential Regulation: Assessment, and Reflections on its Application to Central and Eastern Europe", The Economics of Transition, vol. 2, n. 2, June 1994, p. 129-150.
"Opening the Black Box of Innovation", European Economic Review, vol. 38, n. 3-4, Elsevier, April 1994, p. 701-710.
(with Philippe Aghion)
[ ScienceDirect© ]
"Environmental Policy, Compliance and Innovation", European Economic Review, vol. 38, n. 3-4, Elsevier, April 1994, p. 555-562.
(with Jean-Jacques Laffont)
[ ScienceDirect© ]
"On Banking and Intermediation", European Economic Review, vol. 38, n. 3, Elsevier, April 1994, p. 469-487.
[ Abstract ]
"The International Organization of Government", Oxford Economic Papers, vol. 46, n. 1, January 1994, p. 1-29.
[ Jstor© ]
"Market Liquidity and Performance Monitoring", Journal of Political Economy, vol. 101, n. 4, August 1993, p. 678-709.
(with Bengt Holmström)
[ Jstor© ]
"Cartelization by Regulation", Journal of Regulatory Economics, vol. 5, n. 2, June 1993, p. 111-130.
(with Jean-Jacques Laffont)
[ ScienceDirect© ]
"Should Governments Commit?", European Economic Review, vol. 36, n. 2-3, Elsevier, April 1992, p. 345-353.
(with Jean-Jacques Laffont)
[ Abstract ]
"Cost Padding, Auditing and Collusion", Annales d'Économie et de Statistique, n. 25-26, Institut national de la statistique et des études économiques, Paris, January-June 1992, p. 205-226.
(with Jean-Jacques Laffont)
[ Article ©Journal (PDF file) ]
"The Principal-Agent Relationship with an Informed Principal, II: Common Values", Econometrica, vol. 60, n. 1, January 1992, p. 1-42.
(with Eric Maskin)
[ Jstor© ]
"The Politics of Government Decision Making: A Theory of Regulatory Capture", The Quarterly Journal of Economics, vol. 106, November 1991, p. 1089-1127.
(with Jean-Jacques Laffont)
[ Jstor© ]
"Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium and Sequential Equilibrium", Journal of Economic Theory, vol. 53, n. 2, April 1991, p. 236-260.
(with Drew Fudenberg)
[ ScienceDirect© ]
"Transfer Pricing and Organizational Form", The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, vol. 7, n. 2, Fall 1991, p. 201-228.
(with Bengt Holmström)
"Auction Design anf Favoritism", International Journal of Industrial Organization, vol. 9, 1991, p. 9-42.
(with Jean-Jacques Laffont)
[ ScienceDirect© ]
"Privatization and Incentives", The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, vol. 7, special, 1991, p. 84-105.
(with Jean-Jacques Laffont)
"Optimal Bypass and Cream Skimming", American Economic Review, vol. 80, n. 5, December 1990, p. 1042-1061.
(with Jean-Jacques Laffont)
[ Jstor© ]
"Moral Hazard and Renegotiation in Agency Contracts", Econometrica, vol. 58, n. 6, November 1990, p. 1279-1319.
(with Drew Fudenberg)
[ Jstor© ]
"The Regulation of Multiproduct Firms: Part I: Theory", Journal of Public Economics, vol. 43, n. 1, October 1990, p. 1-36.
(with Jean-Jacques Laffont)
[ ScienceDirect© ]
"The Regulation of Multiproduct Firms: Part II: Applications to Competitive Environments and Policy Analysis", Journal of Public Economics, vol. 43, n. 1, October 1990, p. 37-67.
(with Jean-Jacques Laffont)
[ ScienceDirect© ]
"Adverse Selection and Renegotiation in Procurement", The Review of Economic Studies, vol. 57, n. 4, October 1990, p. 597-625.
(with Jean-Jacques Laffont)
[ Jstor© ]
"L'Economie Politique de la Réglementation", L'Actualité Économique, vol. 66, n. 3, September 1990, p. 305-318.
"The Principal-Agent Relationship with an Informed Principal. I: The Case of Private Values", Econometrica, vol. 58, n. 2, March 1990, p. 379-409.
(with Eric Maskin)
[ Jstor© ]
"Vertical Integration and Market Foreclosure", Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, vol. 1990: "Microeconomics", Brookings Institution, Washington, 1990, p. 205-286.
(with Olivier Hart)
[ Jstor© ]
"In Honor of David Kreps, Winner of the John Bates Clark Medal", Journal of Economic Perspectives, vol. 4, n. 3, Summer 1990, p. 149-170.
[ Jstor© ]
"The Politics of Government Decision Making: Regulatory Institutions", The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, vol. 6, n. 1, Spring 1990, p. 1-32.
(with Jean-Jacques Laffont)
"Contract Renegotiation and Coasian Dynamics", The Review of Economic Studies, vol. 55, n. 4, October 1988, p. 509-540.
(with Olivier Hart)
[ Jstor© ]
"The Dynamics of Incentive Contracts", Econometrica, vol. 56, n. 5, September 1988, p. 1153-1175.
(with Jean-Jacques Laffont)
[ Jstor© ]
"The Multicontract Organization", Canadian Journal of Economics, vol. 21, n. 3, University of Toronto Press, Toronto, August 1988, p. 459-466.
[ Jstor© ]
"A Theory of Dynamic Oligopoly, I: Overview and Quantity Competition with Large Fixed Costs", Econometrica, vol. 56, n. 3, May 1988, p. 549-569.
(with Eric Maskin)
[ Jstor© ]
"A Theory of Dynamic Oligopoly, II: Price Competition, Kinked Demand Curves, and Edgeworth Cycles", Econometrica, vol. 56, n. 3, May 1988, p. 571-599.
(with Eric Maskin)
[ Jstor© | Jstor© ]
"Government Intervention in Production and Incentives Theory: A Review of Recent Contributions", The RAND Journal of Economics, vol. 29, n. 1, Spring 1988, p. 1-26.
(with Bernard Caillaud, Roger Guesnerie and Patrick Rey)
[ Jstor© ]
"Correlated Equilibria and Sunspots", Journal of Economic Theory, vol. 43, n. 2, December 1987, p. 364-373.
(with Eric Maskin)
"Comparative Statics of the Optimal Dynamic Incentive Contract", European Economic Review, vol. 31, n. 4, Elsevier, June 1987, p. 901-926.
(with Jean-Jacques Laffont)
[ ScienceDirect© ]
"A Theory of Dynamic Oligopoly, III: Cournot Competition", European Economic Review, vol. 31, n. 4, Elsevier, June 1987, p. 947-968.
(with Eric Maskin)
[ ScienceDirect© | ScienceDirect© ]
"Understanding Rent Dissipation: On the Use of Game Theory in Industrial Organization", American Economic Review, vol. 77, n. 2, Papers and Proceedings of the Ninety-Ninth Meeting of the American Economic Association, May 1987, p. 176-183.
(with Drew Fudenberg)
[ Jstor© ]
"Incomplete Information Bargaining with Outside Opportunities", The Quarterly Journal of Economics, vol. 102, n. 1, February 1987, p. 37-50.
(with Drew Fudenberg and David K. Levine)
[ Jstor© ]
"The Logic of Vertical Restraints", American Economic Review, vol. 76, n. 5, December 1986, p. 921-939.
(with Patrick Rey)
[ Jstor© ]
"A Theory of Exit in Duopoly", Econometrica, vol. 54, n. 4, July 1986, p. 943-960.
(with Drew Fudenberg)
[ Jstor© ]
"Using Cost Observation to Regulate Firms", Journal of Political Economy, vol. 94, n. 3, June 1986, p. 614-641.
(with Jean-Jacques Laffont)
[ Jstor© ]
"Procurement and Renegotiation", Journal of Political Economy, vol. 94, n. 2, April 1986, p. 235-259.
[ Jstor© ]
"Une Théorie Normative des Contrats État-Entreprises", Annales d'Économie et de Statistique, n. 1, Institut national de la statistique et des études économiques, Paris, January-March 1986, p. 107-132.
(with Jean-Jacques Laffont)
[ Article ©Journal (PDF file) ]
"Contraintes Verticales : l'Approche Principal-Agent", Annales d'Économie et de Statistique, n. 1, Institut national de la statistique et des études économiques, Paris, January-March 1986, p. 175-201.
(with Patrick Rey)
[ Article ©Journal (PDF file) ]
"A "Signal-Jamming" Theory of Predation", The RAND Journal of Economics, vol. 17, n. 3, Autumn 1986, p. 366-376.
(with Drew Fudenberg)
[ Jstor© ]
"Hierarchies and Bureaucracies", The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 1986.
"Asset Bubbles and Overlapping Generations", Econometrica, vol. 53, n. 6, November 1985, p. 1499-1528.
[ Jstor© | Jstor© ]
"L'Economie de la Recherche Developement : Introduction à Certains Travaux Théoriques", Revue Économique, vol. 36, n. 5, September 1985, p. 843-871.
(with Roger Guesnerie)
"Preemption and Rent Equalization in the Adoption of New Technology", The Review of Economic Studies, vol. 52, n. 3, July 1985, p. 383-401.
(with Drew Fudenberg)
[ Jstor© | Jstor© ]
"Planning under Incomplete Information and the Ratchet Effect", The Review of Economic Studies, vol. 52, n. 2, April 1985, p. 173-191.
(with Xavier Freixas and Roger Guesnerie)
[ Jstor© ]
"The Fat-Cat Effect, the Puppy-Dog Ploy, and the Lean and Hungry Look", American Economic Review, vol. 74, n. 2, May 1984, p. 361-366.
(with Drew Fudenberg)
[ Jstor© ]
"On the Efficiency of Fixed Price Equilibrium", Journal of Economic Theory, vol. 32, n. 2, April 1984, p. 317-327.
[ Abstract ]
"Capital as a Commitment: Strategic Investment to Deter Mobility", Journal of Economic Theory, vol. 31, n. 2, December 1983, p. 227-250.
(with Drew Fudenberg)
[ ScienceDirect© ]
"Jeux Dynamiques : Un Guide de l'Utilisateur", Revue d'Économie Politique, vol. 93, n. 4, July-August 1983, p. 551-575.
"Preemption, Leapfrogging and Competition in Patent Races", European Economic Review, vol. 22, n. 1, Elsevier, June 1983, p. 3-31.
(with Drew Fudenberg, Richard J. Gilbert and Joseph Stiglitz)
[ ScienceDirect© ]
"Sequential Bargaining under Incomplete Information", The Review of Economic Studies, vol. 50, n. 2, April 1983, p. 221-247.
(with Drew Fudenberg)
[ Jstor© ]
"Learning-by-Doing and Market Performance", The Bell Journal of Economics, vol. 14, n. 2, Autumn 1983, p. 522-530.
(with Drew Fudenberg)
[ Jstor© ]
"On the Possibility of Speculation under Rational Expectations", Econometrica, vol. 50, n. 5, September 1982, p. 1163-1182.
[ Jstor© ]
"Taux d'Actualisation et Optimum Second", Revue Économique, vol. 32, n. 5, September 1981, p. 829-869.
"Tax Reform from the Gradient Projection Viewpoint", Journal of Public Economics, n. 15, June 1981, p. 275-293.
(with Roger Guesnerie)
Books
Balancing the Banks: Global Lessons from the Financial Crisis, Princeton University Press, 2010.
(with Mathias Dewatripont and Jean-Charles Rochet)
[ Web Page ]
The Theory of Corporate Finance, Princeton University Press, January 2006.
[ Website ]
Financial Crises, Liquidity and the International Monetary System, Princeton University Press, 2002.
[ Website ]
Competition in Telecommunications, series Munich Lectures in Economics, MIT Press, 1999.
(with Jean-Jacques Laffont)
The Prudential Regulation of Banks, MIT Press, 1994.
(with Mathias Dewatripont)
A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation, MIT Press, 1993.
(with Jean-Jacques Laffont)
Game Theory, MIT Press, 1991.
(with Drew Fudenberg)
The Theory of Industrial Organization, MIT Press, 1988.
Contributions to books
"Competition Policy in Two-Sided Markets", in Handbook of Antitrust Economics, Paolo Buccirossi (eds.), The MIT Press, April 2008, p. 543-582.
(with Jean-Charles Rochet)
"Laffont, Jean-Jacques (1947-2004)", in The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics and the Law, Steven Durlauf et Lawrence E. Blume (eds.) (2nd), Palgrave Macmillan, 2008.
[ Website ]
"The Economics of Tacit Collusion: Implications for Merger Control", in The Political Economy of Antitrust, Vivek Ghosal and Johan Stennek (eds.), 2007, p. 217-240.
(with Marc Ivaldi, Patrick Rey and Paul Seabright)
"A Primer on Foreclosure", in Handbook of Industrial Organization, Mark Armstrong and Rob Porter (eds.), vol. III, North Holland, 2007, p. 2145-2220.
(with Patrick Rey)
[ Full text (PDF file, 752 Kb) ]
"Intellectual Property and Health in Developing Countries", in Understanding Poverty, A. Banerjee, R. Benabou and D. Mookherjee (eds.), December 2005.
[ Full text (PDF file, 96 Kb) ]
Chapter 14, "Telecommunications and Competition", in The Economics of Antitrust and Regulation in Telecommunications, Pierre A. BUIGUES and Patrick REY (eds.), Edgard Elgar, 2004, p. 206-265.
"Self Knowledge and Self Regulation: An Economic Approach", in Collected Essays in Psychology and Economics, I. Brocas and J. Carillo (eds.), Oxford University Press, 2003.
(with Richard Zeckhauser)
"Collusion and the Theory of Organizations", in Advances in Economic Theory: Proceedings of the Sixth World Congress of the Econometric Society, Jean-Jacques Laffont (eds.), series Econometric Society Monographs, vol. 1 & 2, Cambridge University Press, 1992.
"Efficient Governance Structure : Implications for Banking Regulation", in Financial Intermediation in the Construction of Europe, C. Mayer and X. Vives (eds.), Cambridge University Press, 1992.
(with Mathias Dewatripont)
Articles in the Press
"Un plan pour sauver l'euro", L' Expansion, n. 755, September 2010.
[ Full text (PDF file, 24 Kb) ]
"Après l'échec de Copenhague, que préconisez-vous ?", La Tribune, March 15, 2010.
[ Video ]
"Sans coordination internationale, est-ce la peine de taxer le carbone?", La Tribune, March 3, 2010.
"Taxe carbone: de Charybde en Scylla?", Les Echos, January 6, 2010.
(with Christian Gollier)
[ Full text (PDF file, 261 Kb) ]
"Négociations climatiques: Copenhague ou l'heure de vérité", Le Monde, November 3, 2009.
"Comment répondre à l'impératif écologique de façon rationnelle?", Le Monde, September 8, 2009.
(with Christian Gollier)
"Cinq réformes clés pour la finance mondiale", La Tribune, November 3, 2008.
"En finir avec les tabous", Le Monde, December 11, 2007.
"La finance d'entreprise revisitée", Les Echos, June 11, 2007.
[ Full text (PDF file) ]
"Quatre recettes pour un Etat efficace", L' Expansion, n. 720, June 2007.
[ Full text (PDF file, 132 Kb) ]
"Nos autorités de régulation doivent rester indépendantes", Le Monde, January 23, 2007.
"Vendeur ou acheteur: qui doit payer ?", Les Echos, November 13, 2006.
"L'Etat a mieux à faire que de combattre les OPA", L' Expansion, n. 707, April 2006.
[ Full text ]
Reports
Politique climatique: une nouvelle architecture internationale, n. 27, Rapport pour le Conseil d'Analyse Economique, La Documentation Française, October 2009.
[ Full text (PDF file) ]
La protection de l'emploi, Rapport pour le Conseil d'Analyse Economique, 2003.
(with Olivier Jean Blanchard)
Protection de la propriété intellectuelle: une introduction et quelques pistes de réflexion, Rapport pour le Conseil d'Analyse Economique, 2003.
Supplementary Material and Missing Proofs
Addendum to "Speculative Attacks and Risk Management", August 2006.
(with Parag A. Pathak)
[ Full text (PDF file, 171 Kb) ]
Appendix of "Modes of Communication", December 2004.
(with Mathias Dewatripont)
[ Full text (PDF file, 129 Kb) ]